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PLEASE RECOGNIZE ME: THE UNITED
KINGDOM SHOULD ENACT THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF INSOLVENCY-RELATED
JUDGMENTS
INTRODUCTION

I

nsolvency in a single country can involve many stakeholders, from debtors to creditors such as banks, noteholders,
stockholders, suppliers, employees, and legal professionals.1 In
the global economy, the challenge is ramped up given that
debtors and creditors may span multiple sovereign jurisdictions.2 Cross-border insolvency occurs when two or more different countries’ legal systems become intertwined through a
bankruptcy proceeding.3 Most often these proceedings arise because a bankruptcy case is opened in one country while at least
some of the debtor’s subsidiaries, assets, and creditors are located in other countries.4
Since 1995, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has been developing tools to meet the
challenges of having different insolvency laws managing a single cross-border insolvency.5 By 1997, UNCITRAL’s Working
Group V (WG V) completed the Model Law on Cross-Border In-

1. Andrew B. Dawson, Modularity in Cross-Border Insolvency, 93 CHI.KENT L. REV. 678, 682 (2018).
2. Id.; Ralph L. Brill, Modified Universalisms & the Role of Local Legal
Culture in the Making of Cross-Border Insolvency Law, 93 AM. BANKR. L. J.
47, 48 (2019).
3. Douglass G. Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning CrossBorder Insolvencies, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 931, 931 (1994).
4. Id.
5. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Rep. of the Working
Group on Insolvency Law on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc A/CN.9/419 (1995) (the mandate to develop legal tools to assist in the
resolution of cross-border insolvencies was given to UNCITRAL’s WG V in
May 1995); Dawson, supra note 1, at 682 (“If a debtor has assets and creditors in more than one nation, there will be no single jurisdiction that can administer the entire bankruptcy estate or bind all creditors.”).
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solvency (ML-CBI or original model law).6 By September 2020,
the original model law has been adopted by 48 countries.7 In
July of 2018, UNCITRAL approved a second model law,8 the
Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of InsolvencyRelated Judgments (ML-IRJ or new model law).9 The genesis
for the original model law was an increase in cross-border insolvency proceedings that necessitated the development of tools
utilizing a modified-universalist10 approach to these cases.11
The genesis for the new12 model law was one particular case in
the UK that did not follow the modified-universalist approach,
Rubin v. Eurofinance SA.13 This case created a risk that is not
just limited to the UK, as other countries may use Rubin as
persuasive authority.14
6. See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE
ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2 (2013) [hereinafter ML-CBI].
7. Status: UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (2020),
UNCITRAL,
https://uncitral.un.org/ar/texts/insolvency/modellaw/crossborder_insolvency/status (last visited July 4, 2020) [hereinafter ML-CBI
STATUS]; see John A. E. Pottow, The Dialogic Aspect of Soft Law in International Insolvency: Discord, Digression, and Development, 40 MICH. J. INT’L L.
479, 484 (2019).
8. See UNCITRAL, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-First Session, ¶ 131,
U.N. Doc A/73/17 (2018).
9. See UNCITRAL, RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF INSOLVENCYRELATED JUDGMENTS WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.19.V.8.
(2019) [hereinafter ML-IRJ].
10. Modified-universalism “accepts the central premise of universalism,
that assets should be collected and distributed on a worldwide basis but reserves to local courts discretion to evaluate the fairness of the home-country
procedures and to protect the interests of local creditors.” Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 499, 517 (1991).
11. Lia Metreveli, Toward Standardized Enforcement of Cross-Border Insolvency Decisions: Encouraging the United States to Adopt UNCITRAL’s
Recent Amendment to its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 51 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 315, 317 (2017); Irit Mevorich, Modified Universalism as
Customary International Law¸ 96 TEX. L. REV. 1403, 1404 (2018).
12. While the new Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency Related Judgments is still new, since the adoption of this model law in
2018, WG V finished work on a third model law in 2019, the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Enterprise Group Insolvency. See UNCITRAL, Rep. on the
Work of Its Fifty-Second Session, ¶ 110, U.N. Doc A/74/17 (2019).
13. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, [2012] UKSC 46 (appeal taken from Eng.).
14. Pottow, supra note 7, at 485 (noting Korean delegate’s concern of the
applicability of Rubin in Korea).
TO
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In Rubin, the UK Supreme Court cited a lack of authority to
recognize a US insolvency-related judgment15 in the ML-CBI
and issued a ruling with the effect of pulling the UK away from
the benefits of the modified-universalist approach in insolvency.16 In particular, the Court held that the ML-CBI did not provide a mechanism to recognize an insolvency judgment from an
avoidance proceeding outside the UK; therefore, in order to review the applicability of this foreign judgment, the Court could
not use the original model law and instead turned to a common
law doctrine, the Dicey Rule, for the recognition of foreign
judgments.17 The UK court determined that the US court did
15. Here it is important to note the subtle distinction being made between
an insolvency proceeding and an insolvency-related judgment. For example,
when the original bankruptcy case in Rubin was opened in the US under
Chapter 11 to reorganize TCT, that action is a bankruptcy proceeding. Rubin,
[2012] UKSC 46, [60]. When the representatives wished to claw back payments made from TCT to Roman and Eurofinance SA, the representatives
opened a distinct case under the umbrella of the larger insolvency proceeding.
Id. [62]. This was the adversary proceeding that resulted in an insolvencyrelated judgment. Brill supra note 2, at 96.
16. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 2 (“The work on this topic had its origin,
in part, in certain judicial decisions . . .”); Dawson, supra note 1, at 684-85;
Metreveli, supra note 11, at 317; Pottow, supra note 7, 488; Varoon Sachdev,
Choice of Law in Insolvency Proceedings: How English Courts’ Continued Reliance on the Gibbs Principle Threatens Universalism, 93 AM BANKR L. J. 343,
372 (2019) (“This rebuke of the narrow English interpretation of Article 21 is
a rather remarkable step from a diplomatic working group.”); Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2276, 2282–83 (2000).
17. In Rubin, Lord Collins referred to the common law standard as laid out
in Rule 43 in Dicey, Morris & Collins on Conflict of Laws (15th edn. 2012) as
the Dicey Rule, so shall this Note. This Dicey Rule states:
A court of a foreign country outside the United Kingdom has
jurisdiction to give a judgment in personam capable of enforcement or recognition as against the person against
whom it was given in the following cases: First Case—If the
person against whom the judgment was given was, at the
time the proceedings were instituted, present in the foreign
country. Second Case—If the person against whom the
judgment was given was claimant, or counterclaimed, in the
proceedings in the foreign court. Third Case—If the person
against whom the judgment was given submitted to the jurisdiction of that court by voluntarily appearing in the proceedings. Fourth Case—If the person against whom the
judgment was given had before the commencement of the
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not have the personal jurisdiction necessary to make a judgment against the UK parties, Roman and Eurofinance SA,
when those parties did not voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New
York (SDNY).18
The new model law was designed to be implemented either as
a full law, or as a single article “patch” updating a state’s existing implementation of the original model law.19 As of the September 2020, no jurisdiction has adopted the new model law in
either form.20 This Note intends to address the following question: does the ML-IRJ provide a statutory basis to reverse the
case law established by Rubin in the UK? This Note will
demonstrate, through an analysis of the new model law, that a
full implementation of the ML-IRJ could potentially, but not
definitely, provide such a basis. There is a small risk that a
judge rejecting modified-universalism, as Lord Collins did in
Rubin, will not apply the new model law as designed to fix Rubin, leading to another Dicey result.21 Further, this Note will
provide suggestions on where the new model law needs further
direction or clarification in order to more assuredly bring the
UK and other relevant jurisdictions back in line with a modified-universalist approach that UNCITRAL is targeting.22
Part I of this Note breaks down key principles of the original
model law. Part II will survey judicial decisions in the UK prior
to and including Rubin, demonstrating a move towards modiproceedings agreed, in respect of the subject matter of the
proceedings, to submit to the jurisdiction of that court or of
the courts of that country.
Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [7].
18. Id. [128].
19. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 41.
20. It took approximately three years for the ML-CBI to be enacted; therefore, it is still early to make any judgements on the efficacy of new model law.
ML-CBI STATUS, supra note 7.
21. Pun intended.
22. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 2 (“Moreover, there was a concern that
decisions by foreign courts determining the lack of such explicit authority in
the [ML-CBI] for recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments might have been regarded as persuasive authority in those States with
legislation based upon Article 8, [ML-CBI], which relates to international
effect.”); INSOL, UNCITRAL and World Bank, REPORT ON THE 13TH
MULTINATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLOQUIUM, ¶ 7 (April 1–2, 2019),
https://www.insol.org/library/opendownload/1277.
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fied-universalism, which was then pulled back. Part III will
explore key components of the new model law and how several
of the articles might help reverse the decision in Rubin. Part IV
will carefully apply an interpretation of the combined full model laws to the facts behind Rubin to demonstrate that Rubin
could be overturned, but that a risk remains that it will not be
overturned. Finally, Part V will suggest enhancements to the
new model law that will mitigate the risk of it being sliced and
diced by a narrow interpretation of the new model law.23
I. MODERN CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
To understand the work products that UNCITRAL WG V has
created with both model laws, it is important to understand the
various theories of cross-border insolvency that existed at the
time UNCITRAL began its work on insolvency.24 Once reviewed, the remainder of this section will review key aspects of
the original model law most pertinent to Rubin.
A. Territorialism to Universalism
The theories behind efforts to improve cross-border insolvency are best described as a continuum with territorialism on one
end and universalism on the other.25 The differences between
these theories is centered around the balance of power between
the sovereignty of each state and the efficiency of a centrally
administered proceeding.26 There is a general pull towards universalism over time, and while many academics disagree on the
best solution for today, those same academics suggest that universalism is the end goal.27
23. Again, pun very much intended.
24. See Andre J. Berends, The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border
Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 309, 313
(1998).
25. Nigel John Howcroft, Universal v. Territorial Models for Cross-Border
Insolvency: The Theory, the Practice, and the Reality that Universalism Prevails, 8 U. C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 366, 369–70 (2008).
26. Berends, supra note 24, at 313-14; Lynn M LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territorial in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216,
2217 (2000); Westbrook, supra note 16, at 2277.
27. REINHART BORK, PRINCIPLES OF CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY LAW, 28
(2017); Brill, supra note 2, at 51; Howcraft, supra note 25, at 373 (opponents
of universalism accept that a universalist approach would be preferable);
LoPucki, supra note 26, at 2217 (“it is likely that the globalization of business
eventually will harmonize the now-divergent debt collection and insolvency
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There are generally four defined areas of rules along the continuum: territorialism, cooperative-territorialism, modifieduniversalism, and universalism.28 Under territorialism, courts
assert control over a debtor’s assets within its jurisdiction for
the primary benefit of resolving claims from creditors within
that jurisdiction.29 Cooperative-territorialism is a model that
increases cooperation between courts in different jurisdictions.30 In this system, each country is responsible for the assets that it has the “sovereign power to marshal” and where the
company’s plan is to liquidate, the priority rules in effect would
be the local rules.31 Universalism is generally viewed to be the
ideal model.32 The basic concept of universalism is two-fold.
First, the theory holds it is optimal that there be a single proceeding and location to deal with the liquidation or reorganization of a debtor’s business.33 Second, that the debtor’s center of
its main interests should determine the legal rules in effect for
systems of the countries of the world, making conditions ripe for universalism.”); Westbrook, supra note 16, at 2299 (“I have argued that the proper
long-term, theoretical solution to the problem of multinational insolvency is
universalism, whether or not such a solution is achievable in the foreseeable
future.”).
28. Howcroft, supra note 25, at 369–70. See also Brill supra note 2, at n.20
(listing several seminal articles on the various models). Additionally, there
are offshoots of this continuum as different alternative ideas were espoused
in academic papers; however, since the impact of Rubin and the new model
law arises along the territorialism – universalism continuum, we will limit
our discussion here. For examples of other theories see generally Edward J.
Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 819 (2007); Edward J.
Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional Baseline in Cross-Border Bankruptcies, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN & COM. L. 85 (2014); Robert K. Rasmussen,
Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV.
51 (1992); Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies
Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000).
29. Westbrook, supra note 16, at 2282; Howcroft, supra note 25, at 371.
30. Lynn M LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A PostUniversalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 701 (1999).
31. Id. at 743.
32. John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 935, 947 (2005).
33. Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV., 2177, 2178 (2000) (citing John Lowell, Conflict of
Laws as Applied to Assignments of Creditors, 1 HARV. L. REV., 259, 264 (1888)
“It is obvious that . . . it would be better in nine cases out of ten that all settlements of insolvent debtors with their creditors should be made in a single
proceeding, and generally at a single place.”).
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the insolvency.34 The main argument against universalism is
political; effectively, a single global law is not ready to be
agreed upon by the various sovereign states.35 Modifieduniversalism is “universalism tempered by a sense of what is
practical at the current stage of international legal development.”36 Modified-universalism operates by distinguishing between a single primary proceeding, called a main proceeding,
held at a debtor’s center of its main interests and one to many
secondary proceedings, or non-main proceedings, held in other
forums.37 These secondary forums do not default to accepting
the decisions of other jurisdictions without some level of review.38 While the debate over different solutions is not necessarily over, the path that UNCITRAL set out on with its original model law was one of modified-universalism.39 One of the
major challenges in Rubin is how that decision affects not just
the UK, but other countries with the original model law.40
B. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
In May 1997, UNCITRAL adopted the text of the Model Law
on Cross-Border Insolvency.41 The ML-CBI is not a collection
of substantive rules but instead, systematic or procedural
rules42 with aspirations of comity.43 In creating the original
34. Id.; see Westbrook, supra note 16, at 2317; UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL
MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: THE JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE, ¶ 98,
U.N. Sales No. V.14-00242 (updated 2013), [hereinafter “Judicial”] (“The concept of ‘centre of main interests’ must be interpreted as the place where the
debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is
therefore ascertainable by third parties.”)
35. Westbrook, supra note 16, at 2298.
36. Id. at 2299.
37. Id. at 2230.
38. Howcroft, supra note 25, at 370.
39. Id. at 413; Metreveli, supra note 11, at 317.
40. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [128]; ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 2; MLCBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art 8, pt. 2, ¶ 106 (harmonizing interpretation).
41. ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, at pmbl.
42. Westbrook, supra note 16, at 2279; Judicial, supra note 34, ¶ 9.
43. See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (‘“Comity’, in the legal
sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere
courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts
of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws.”).
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model law, WG V defined four principles: (1) “Access Principle”,
to allow a foreign representative rapid access to the judicial
system; (2) “Recognition Principle”, to recognize an insolvency
proceeding in another state; (3) “Relief Principle”, to provide
either interim, automatic or discretionary relief; and (4) “Cooperation Principle”, to communicate and to generally recognize
court orders from other countries,44 based on comity. 45 In support of these principles, WG V laid out the specific public policy
objectives the original model law should achieve.46 For this
analysis, the principles of “Recognition” and “Relief” are most
germane to analyzing the Rubin case.
1. The Recognition Principle
This principle defines the process by which courts recognize
the foreign proceeding once a foreign representative is granted
access.47 In support of recognition, the ML-CBI makes a distinction between recognizing a foreign main proceeding and a
foreign non-main proceeding.48 The original model law requires
44. Judicial, supra note 34, ¶ 14.
45. Bruce A. Markell, Infinite Jest: The Otiose Quest for Completeness in
Validating Insolvency Judgments, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 751 - 52 (2018).
46. The Preamble of ML-CBI states:
The purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms
for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency so as to
promote the objectives of: (a) Cooperation between the
courts and other competent authorities of this State and
foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency;
(b) Greater legal certainty for trade and investment; (c) Fair
and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies
that protects the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor; (d) Protection and maximization of the value of the debtor’s assets; and (e) Facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby
protecting investment and preserving employment.
ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, at pmbl; Judicial, supra note 34, ¶ 15.
47. Berends, supra note 24, at 350.
48. Article 2 of ML-CBI states:
Definitions For the purposes of this Law: (a) “Foreign proceeding” means a collective judicial or administrative proceeding in a foreign State, including an interim proceeding,
pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding
the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or
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that a foreign representative must provide certain basic information, or evidence, in order for a foreign proceeding to be recognized.49 The court is then permitted to presume the documents provided are authentic.50
Article 17 of the model law provides courts the power of
recognition.51 The chapeau of this Article makes it clear that
supervision by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation; (b) “Foreign main proceeding” means a
foreign proceeding taking place in the State where the debtor has the centre of its main interests; (c) “Foreign non-main
proceeding” means a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, taking place in a State where the
debtor has an establishment within the meaning of subparagraph (f) of this article.
ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 2 (subparagraphs d–f omitted).
49. Article 15 of ML-CBI states:
Application for recognition of a foreign proceeding: 1. A foreign representative may apply to the court for recognition of
the foreign proceeding in which the foreign representative
has been appointed. 2. An application for recognition shall
be accompanied by: (a) A certified copy of the decision commencing the foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign
representative; or (b) A certificate from the foreign court affirming the existence of the foreign proceeding and of the
appointment of the foreign representative; or (c) In the absence of evidence referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b),
any other evidence acceptable to the court of the existence of
the foreign proceeding and of the appointment of the foreign
representative.
Id. pt. 1, art. 15 (paragraphs 3 & 4 omitted); see Judicial, supra note 34, ¶ 41.
50. Article 16 of ML-CBI states:
Presumptions concerning recognition: 1. If the decision or
certificate referred to in paragraph 2 of article 15 indicates
that the foreign proceeding is a proceeding within the meaning of subparagraph (a) of article 2 and that the foreign representative is a person or body within the meaning of subparagraph (d) of article 2, the court is entitled to so presume. 2. The court is entitled to presume that documents
submitted in support of the application for recognition are
authentic, whether or not they have been legalized.
ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 16 (paragraph 3 omitted).
51. Judicial, supra note 34, ¶ 42.
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this Article is not discretionary by its use of “shall.”52 Recognition will be granted if the proceedings, foreign representatives,
court, and application materials meet the definitions specified
for each in the relevant articles.53 These articles are meant to
expedite recognition.54 For example, allowing the court to presume the documents provided by the representative are authentic speeds up recognition.55 This allows the court and foreign representative to move into the relief phase.56
2. The Relief Principle
Once recognition has been granted, the next phase is relief
where a set of rules automatically go into effect once a foreign
main proceeding has been recognized.57 The specific rules are
52. Article 17 of ML-CBI states:
Decision to recognize a foreign proceeding: 1. Subject to article 6, a foreign proceeding shall be recognized if: (a) The
foreign proceeding is a proceeding within the meaning of
Subparagraph (a) of article 2; (b) The foreign representative
applying for recognition is a person or body within the
meaning of subparagraph (d) of article 2; (c) The application
meets the requirements of paragraph 2 of article 15; and (d)
The application has been submitted to the court referred to
in article 4. 2. The foreign proceeding shall be recognized:
(a) As a foreign main proceeding if it is taking place in the
State where the debtor has the centre of its main interests;
or (b) As a foreign non-main proceeding if the debtor has an
establishment within the meaning of subparagraph (f) of article 2 in the foreign State.
ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 17 (paragraphs 3 & 4 omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. pt. 2, ¶ 127; Berends, supra note 24, at 322.
55. Judicial, supra note 34, ¶ 43.
56. The types of relief available includes interim relief; therefore, it is feasible for relief to commence prior to the completion of recognition. The other
types of relief available, and relevant for Rubin, are automatic and discretionary relief. Id. ¶ 144.
57. Article 20 of ML-CBI states:
Effects of recognition of a foreign main proceeding: 1. Upon
recognition of a foreign proceeding that is a foreign main
proceeding: (a) Commencement or continuation of individual
actions or individual proceedings concerning the debtor’s assets, rights, obligations or liabilities is stayed; (b) Execution
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laid out in Article 20 and include an automatic stay.58 While an
automatic stay is a prevalent practice, the model law specifies
the rules for the stay.59 It is important to understand that,
while the relief in Article 20 is automatic, such relief is only
applied if the foreign proceeding is recognized as a foreign main
proceeding.60
Article 21 defines additional discretionary relief that is available.61 First, the court can apply any of the relief that is autoagainst the debtor’s assets is stayed; and (c) The right to
transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of any assets of the
debtor is suspended.
ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 20 (paragraphs 2–4 omitted).
58. Id.
59. Judicial, supra note 34, ¶ 145.
60. ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 17.
61. Article 21 of ML-CBI states:
Relief that may be granted upon recognition of a foreign
proceeding: 1. Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding,
whether main or nonmain, where necessary to protect the
assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors, the
court may, at the request of the foreign representative,
grant any appropriate relief, including: (a) Staying the
commencement or continuation of individual actions or individual proceedings concerning the debtor’s assets, rights,
obligations or liabilities, to the extent they have not been
stayed under paragraph 1 (a) of article 20; (b) Staying execution against the debtor’s assets to the extent it has not
been stayed under paragraph 1 (b) of article 20; (c) Suspending the right to transfer, encumber or otherwise dispose of
any assets of the debtor to the extent this right has not been
suspended under paragraph 1 (c) of article 20; (d) Providing
for the examination of witnesses, the taking of evidence or
the delivery of information concerning the debtor’s assets,
affairs, rights, obligations or liabilities; (e) Entrusting the
administration or realization of all or part of the debtor’s
assets located in this State to the foreign representative or
another person designated by the court; (f) Extending relief
granted under paragraph 1 of article 19; (g) Granting any
additional relief that may be available to [insert the title of
a person or body administering a reorganization or liquidation under the law of the enacting State] under the laws of
this State. 2. Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding,
whether main or nonmain the court may, at the request of
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matic for a foreign main proceeding discretionally to a foreign
non-main proceeding.62 Second, the foreign representative can
be granted access to conduct investigations and to administer
the estate within that jurisdiction.63 Third, the court can make
available any relief that is generally available for insolvency
administrators, as defined for that state.64 These are the specific tools that are granted in the article; however, the original
model law also provides that this list is not exhaustive or
meant to limit a court in terms of providing discretionary relief.65 Finally, upon request, the court can grant the power to
distribute the assets of the bankruptcy estate, including remitting the assets out of the jurisdiction by the foreign representative.66
The powers of relief granted in these Articles is only limited
by the condition that the court be satisfied that the interests of
local creditors, debtors and other interested parties are adequately protected.67 This creates an important check on the ac-

the foreign representative, entrust the distribution of all or
part of the debtor’s assets located in this State to the foreign
representative or another person designated by the court,
provided that the court is satisfied that the interests of creditors in this State are adequately protected.
Id. pt. 1, art. 21 (paragraph 3 omitted).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Judicial, supra note 34, ¶ 169.
66. ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 21.
67. Article 22 of ML-CBI states:
Protection of creditors and other interested persons 1. In
granting or denying relief under article 19 or 21, or in modifying or terminating relief under paragraph 3 of this article,
the court must be satisfied that the interests of the creditors
and other interested persons, including the debtor, are adequately protected. 2. The court may subject relief granted
under article 19 or 21 to conditions it considers appropriate.
3. The court may, at the request of the foreign representative or a person affected by relief granted under article 19 or
21, or at its own motion, modify or terminate such relief
Id. pt. 1, art. 22.
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tivities of the foreign representative and the court by taking
into consideration interests of creditors and third parties.68
While there is broad assistance available under the available
discretionary relief, there is broader additional assistance allowed under Article 7.69 This article allows a court to aid a foreign representative utilizing any other law of the enacting
state.70 This is another example of the principle of comity embodied in the original model law.71 This article does not limit
the assistance available to only that which is defined in the
ML-CBI.72
There is important interplay between Articles 21 and 7 to determine if the requested relief is available.73 Article 21 provides
a list of specific discretionary relief available, and therefore, it
should be the starting point for any analysis of such relief.74 If
the relief is not specifically mentioned as available discretionary relief in Article 21, the next step is to determine if general
“appropriate relief” is available under Article 21(1).75 If the relief still cannot be supported, then Article 7 opens up general
relief under the laws of that jurisdiction.76 In the US, In Re
Vitro defined this roadmap; that court looked for the relief in
the most specific form first, expanding outwards.77
68. Id. pt. 2, ¶ 196.
69. In re Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d, 1031, 1056– 57 (2012).
70. Article 7 of ML-CBI states:
Additional assistance under other laws: Nothing in this
Law limits the power of a court or a [insert the title of the
person or body administering a reorganization or liquidation
under the law of the enacting State] to provide additional
assistance to a foreign representative under other laws of
this State.
ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 7.
71. In re Vitro, 701 F.3d, at 1055– 56.
72. Judicial, supra note 34, ¶ 181.
73. In re Vitro, 701 F.3d, at 1054 (providing a detailed breakdown and
roadmap for the statutory construction and interplay between Articles 21 and
7).
74. Id. at 1056.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1057; The UK has implemented the Article 8 of the ML-CBI, as
such, the In re Vitro interpretation is available to the UK Courts, under the
concept of promoting “uniformity in [ML-CBI’s] application.” ML-CBI, supra
note 6, pt. 1, art. 8.
77. In re Vitro, 701 F.3d, at 1053–57.
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In summary, the intent of WG V in building the ML-CBI was
to create a modified-universalism model law that would provide
guidance and suggestions for implementing procedural rules,
but not substantive rules, in order to facilitate the efficient distribution of a debtor’s estate in liquidation or restructuring.78
Additionally, the model law would implicitly push for cooperation, or at least comity, between jurisdictions and perhaps
drive a consolidation of substantive law in the future.79 At least
that was the concept, but Rubin was not in alignment with this
goal.80 Before analyzing that case, it is prudent to set the stage
with two key UK Cases that led up to Rubin, both more in line
with modified-universalism.
II. UK CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
In 2006, the UK enacted legislation based on the ML-CBI
dubbed the Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations.81 Following
the enactment of this law, there are two key cases that follow
the rationale of modified-universalism. Those cases were followed by Rubin, pulling the UK away from modifieduniversalism.
A. Cambridge Gas
Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation was a shipping venture that was highly leveraged on the New York Bond Market.82 When shipping rates did not meet expectations, the company lacked the liquidity to make interest payments.83 The
company subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the
SDNY.84 The complication to this bankruptcy arose out of the
corporate structure of the investment, with each of five ships
being owned by a holding company, Navigator, which itself was
owned by a number of other off-shore corporations, including
Cambridge Gas.85
78. Westbrook, supra note 16, at 2279.
79. Id. at 2299.
80. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [1].
81. Id.
82. Cambridge Gas Transp. Corp. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator Holdings Plc, [2006] UKPC 26, [1] (appeal taken from Isle of
Man).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. [2–3]
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In the SDNY Bankruptcy Court, both the debtor and the
creditors put forward plans, with the court eventually choosing
the creditors’ plan.86 In essence, the creditors’ proposal was
that they would become the owners of the Navigator holding
company. 87 While the court approved the plan, the nature of
the corporate structure required the approval of the courts in
the Isle of Man.88 The argument before the court in the Isle of
Man, made by Cambridge Gas, the owner of Navigator, was
that it did not participate in the bankruptcy proceeding in the
US courts and that therefore, those courts did not have the
personal jurisdiction necessary to “affect its rights of property
in shares” of Navigator.89
In the final decision of Cambridge Gas, Lord Hoffman of the
Privy Council considered that if one considers the US Bankruptcy Court’s judgment to be either in personam or in rem,
then the US court would not be able to transfer ownership of
Navigator from Cambridge Gas to the creditors.90 Lord Hoffman, however, reasoned that bankruptcy proceedings do “not . .
. determine or establish the existence of rights, but . . . provide
a mechanism of collective execution against the property of the
debtor by creditors whose rights are admitted or established.”91

The ships, registered in Liberia, were owned and managed
by a group of Isle of Man companies, each ship owned by a
separate subsidiary of a management company and all the
shares in the management company held by a holding company, Navigator Holdings plc. . . . Navigator was in turn
held through a web of companies incorporated in other offshore jurisdictions, of which it is for present purposes necessary to mention only two: Cambridge Gas Transport Corporation (“Cambridge”), a Cayman company which owns, directly or indirectly, at least 70% of the issued share capital
of Navigator, and Vela Energy Holdings Ltd (“Vela”), a Bahamian company which (through an intermediate wholly
owned Bahamian subsidiary) owns all the issued share capital in Cambridge.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. [4].
Id.
Id. [5–6].
Id. [7].
Id. [13].
Id. [14].
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As a result, the US judgment was enforced. 92 Additionally, in
Cambridge Gas, Lord Hoffman made an argument for supporting modified-universalism based on a tradition of cross-border
insolvency cases in the UK.93 His assertions of the benefits of
universalism are in-line with the work of Professor Westbrook,
known as one of the most fervent supporters of universalism.94
B. HIH Casualty
This case involved a group of Australian insurance companies
with assets located in London.95 HIH Casualty opened insolvency proceedings in Australia.96 The Australian court requested that the assets available in the UK be remitted to Australia
for distribution under the rules of priority in Australia.97
Again, Lord Hoffman, in support of modified-universalism,
stated that “[a]pplicable to this case is the principle of (modified) universalism . . . . That principle requires that English
courts should, so far as is consistent with justice and UK public
policy, co-operate with the courts in the country of the principal
liquidation.”98 Based on that reasoning, the court held that the
assets should be remitted to Australia, regardless of the fact
that Australia and UK had different laws regarding the prioritization of creditors.99

92. Id.
93. Id. [16] (noting a cross-border insolvency case from 1764).
94. Compare id. (“There should be a single bankruptcy in which all creditors are entitled and required to prove. No one should have an advantage
because he happens to live in a jurisdiction where more of the assets or fewer
of the creditors are situated”) with Westbrook, supra note 16, at 2284 (“virtually all theorists have agreed that bankruptcy requires a single proceeding in
which all of the debtor’s assets and claims are administered under a single
set of rules . . . “)
95. McGrath v. Riddell (In re HIH Cas. and Gen.Ins.Ltd.), [2008] UKHL
21 (appeal taken from Eng.).
96. Id. [1].
97. Id.; Judicial, supra note 34, at 90 (the UK and Australia had different
priority rules that governed the assets and creditors in the UK).
98. In re HIH Cas., [2008] UKHL 21, [30].
99. Id. [36].
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C. Rubin
In 2012, the UK Supreme Court made a ruling in Rubin that
caused a stir.100 To understand Rubin in full, it is necessary to
understand the parties to this bankruptcy. Adrian Roman established a British Virgin Islands company, Eurofinance SA;
this entity created a trust in the UK, The Consumers Trust
(TCT), with two lawyers and two accountants as trustees and
with Eurofinance SA as the beneficiary.101 The trust’s purpose
was to create a cash voucher program in the US and Canada.
102 This program worked by allowing vendors to give their consumers a 100% redeemable cash voucher, conditioned on the
individual consumer completing certain steps over a three-year
period. 103 Merchants would pay TCT 15% of the total purchase
price. 104 TCT split that merchant payment as follows: 30% to
Eurofinance SA, 30% to Roman and others, with the trust
keeping the final 40%.105 From that 40% TCT would pay a consumer who met all the required steps in the promotion.106 TCT
encountered a problem when the state of Missouri sued TCT
for violations of the state consumer protection law and other
states started to investigate the company.107 TCT, at the direction of Roman and Eurofinance SA, sought bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 in the SDNY as the threat of more lawsuits increased.108
A liquidation plan for TCT was submitted to the US Court in
September of 2007.109 Later in 2007, Rubin and Lan brought an
adversary proceeding in the US Bankruptcy court to avoid

100. Sachdev, supra note 16, at 371 (noting that Rubin created an “uproar”); see also Markell, supra note 45, at 752 (“Rubin came as somewhat of a
surprise . . . “); Metreveli, supra note 11, at 332 (“The U.K. Supreme Court’s
holding introduces uncertainty into Cross-Border insolvency proceedings . . .
“); Pottow, supra note 7, at 484-85 (referring to Rubin as a “renegade opinion”, and stating “Rubin suffered some deservedly withering criticism.”).
101. In re HIH Cas., [2008] UKHL 21, [54].
102. Id. [55].
103. Id. [56].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. [57–58] (TCT and the Missouri AG settled their case for over $1.8
Million).
108. Id. [59].
109. Id. [61]; ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 2.
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transfers of money from TCT to Eurofinance SA and Roman.110
Upon Eurofinance SA and Roman’s failure to appear in the
SDNY Bankruptcy Court, the court ordered a default and
summary judgment against them.111 Rubin and Lan then applied for and received recognition as foreign representatives
and the US case as a foreign main proceeding under the UK
implementation of the model law.112
At the trial level in the UK, after recognizing the US proceedings, Deputy Judge Strauss QC did not enforce the judgment
brought to the court by Rubin and Lan, under reasoning echoed
by Lord Collins in the final appeal.113 Strauss specifically noted
that the SDNY has established rights in the debtor against a
third party; thus, by implication the judgment was in personam.114 At the first appellate level, however, the court found
that, by the nature of an insolvency proceeding, rules around
judgments in rem or in personam do not apply, and that the
tools of insolvency, such as avoidance against third parties, requires the ability to take collective action for the benefit of
creditors.115 The appellate court found for Rubin and Lan, relying on HIH Casualty and Cambridge Gas.116
At the UK Supreme Court, Lord Collins noted that there are
potentially four methods in which a foreign insolvency judgment might be recognized in the UK, but that the first two did
not apply to any judgment from a US Court.117 The third method was the UK implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Cross-Border Insolvency, and the fourth method was via
common law.118 The UK common law Dicey Rule provides four

110. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [62].
111. Id. [64].
112. Id. [65–66].
113. Id. [66].
114. Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 895, [29].
115. Id. [61] (referring to bankruptcy proceedings as a sui generis).
116. Id. [62].
117. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [25]–[26] (the first two options are the Insolvency Act of 1986, provides for recognition of judgments from certain countries, which presumably did not include the US and the EC Insolvency Regulation, which requires the Centre of Main Interests to be based in the European Union).
118. Id. [27–29].
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methods by which a UK court can give effect to a foreign court’s
judgment in personam.119
In analyzing the option of using the ML-CBI to enforce the
US judgment, the UK Supreme Court first confirmed that the
US bankruptcy action was a foreign main proceeding, including
the adversary proceeding specifically related to the avoidance
claims.120 Next, the UK court analyzed if relief was available
under ML-CBI Article 21 (discretionary relief).121 The UK court
noted that “recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
is not specifically mentioned” and should not be implied against
third parties.122 The court then determined that relief was not
available under Article 21 as that article is “concerned with
procedural matters.”123
In analyzing the possibility of recognizing the avoidance
judgment under common law, the UK court first noted the decision in the appeal.124 The appellate court considered the
avoidance action to be an in personam judgment but considered
that the “Dicey Rule did not apply to foreign judgments in
avoidance proceedings because they were central to the collective enforcement regime in insolvency and were governed by
special rules.”125 The appellate court employed similar but distinct logic from Cambridge Gas, where the court noted that insolvency proceedings were neither in personam or in rem.126
Looking at the possibility that insolvency was governed by
special rules, Lord Collins noted that it certainly was feasible
to determine a category or list of insolvency judgments, including a few examples of lists used in other jurisdictions;127 however, Lord Collins then balked at the idea that it is for the UK
Supreme Court to determine such a list.128
119. Tristan G. Alexrod, UK Supreme Court Highlights Parochial Roadblocks to Cooperative Crossborder Insolvency in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA, 31
WIS. INT’L L.J. 818, 834 (2014).
120. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [134].
121. Id. [136].
122. Id. [141–43].
123. Id. [143].
124. Id. [89–90].
125. Id. [90].
126. Cambridge Gas, [2006] UKPC 26, [14] (Lord Hoffman noted that if the
judgment in question was found to be in personam that the outcome of the
case would have been different.).
127. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [100].
128. Id. [93–101], [115–17].
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Finally, after determining that there was, as of yet, no special
reason given by Parliament for insolvency judgments to ignore
the Dicey Rule, the court then applied it.129 Given that Dicey
Rule applied, the US judgment could not be enforced as a foreign judgment in the UK since Eurofinance SA and Roman did
not submit to foreign jurisdiction, in particular the adversary
proceeding that resulted in the avoidance judgment as required
by the Dicey Rule.130 In ruling against modified-universalism,
Lord Collins overturned the rulings in Cambridge Gas and
HIH Casualty.131
III. THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF INSOLVENCY-RELATED JUDGMENTS
The UNCITRAL Model Law on the Recognition of InsolvencyRelated Judgments does not replace the original model law;
rather, it is designed to be implemented either as an adjunct to
the ML-CBI or as a stand-alone in jurisdictions that have not
adopted the original model law.132 The enactment guide specifically notes that Rubin was one of the cases serving as a genesis
for the model law.133 The Rubin decision called into question
whether courts had authority to grant recognition of avoidance
proceedings, or bankruptcy judgments in general, under the
original model law.134
In 2014, UNCITRAL WG V, dedicated to insolvency, was given the mandate “to develop a model law or model legislative
provisions to provide for the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments.”135 WG V developed the model law
over the course of eight biannual sessions.136 A final draft
emerged in June 2018 and was adopted by consensus by
UNCITRAL in July 2018.137 The scope of the new model law
encompasses insolvency judgments that are issued in a foreign

129. Id. [106–7].
130. Id. [169].
131. Id. [128].
132. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 41.
133. Id. pt. 2, ¶ 2, n.1.
134. Id. pt. 2, ¶ 2.
135. UNCITRAL, Rep. of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of
Its Fifty-Third Session, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc A/CN.9/937 (2018).
136. See Id.
137. Id. at ¶ 11.
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state that are being brought into the enacting state for purpose
of enforcement.138
WG V defined the object and purpose of the ML-IRJ as “creating greater certainty,” to “minimize duplication” while “maximizing value,” and “promote cooperation and comity” related to
insolvency judgments.139 In building a new model law that can
stand alone, WG V made it possible for jurisdictions to use the
ML-IRJ without having first implemented the original model
law; however, the WG V, by building a new stand-alone model
law, has unfortunately not prescribed how to integrate the MLIRJ into countries that have adopted the ML-CBI.140 Hopefully,
WG V will see their error and correct it in the future, but until
then, this Note will make suggestions on how the key articles
can be integrated.

138. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 1.
139. The Preamble of ML-IRJ states:
1. The purpose of this Law is: (a) To create greater certainty
in regard to rights and remedies for recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments; (b) To avoid the
duplication of insolvency proceedings; (c) To ensure timely
and cost-effective recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments; (d) To promote comity and cooperation between jurisdictions regarding insolvency-related
judgments; (e) To protect and maximize the value of insolvency estates; and (f) Where legislation based on the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency has
been enacted, to complement that legislation. 2. This Law is
not intended: (a) To restrict provisions of the law of this
State that would permit the recognition and enforcement of
an insolvency-related judgment; (b) To replace legislation
enacting the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency or limit the application of that legislation; (c) To apply
to the recognition and enforcement in the enacting State of
an insolvency-related judgment issued in the enacting
State; or (d) To apply to the judgment commencing the insolvency proceeding.
Id. pt. 1, at pmbl.
140. Id. pt. 2.
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A. Article X — Recognition of Insolvency-Related Judgment
The clear purpose of Article X141 is to quickly eliminate the
hole Lord Collins created in Rubin when he stated that “Articles 21, 25 and 27 are concerned with procedural matters. . . .
There is nothing to suggest that they apply to the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments against third parties.”142
Article X was named specifically so that it might be grafted into existing law where states have already enacted the ML-CBI
without going through the process of analyzing and enacting
the entirety of the ML-IRJ.143 As a stopgap measure, it potentially has its uses, but this Note recommends states implement
all the language that is specific to recognition of insolvencyrelated judgments without Article X for two reasons. First, the
new model law is a fuller definition of a process that is focused
on insolvency-related judgments, and that has the benefit of
being more fully considered. Second, implementing Article X
with the remainder of the new model law has the potential to
create a conflict between the recognition Articles 19 to 22 in the
original model law and the recognition Articles 13 and 14 in
the new model law.144
B. Insolvency-Related Judgment Definition
Both the original model law and the new model law define
important terms in Article 2.145 The new model law defines the
very important term “Insolvency-Related Judgment” as excluding any order opening an insolvency proceeding,146 and one that
141. Article X of ML-IRJ states:
Recognition of an insolvency-related judgment under [MLCBI]: Notwithstanding any prior interpretation to the contrary, the relief available under [insert a cross-reference to
the legislation of this State enacting article 21 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency] includes recognition and enforcement of a judgment.
Id. pt. 1, art. X.
142. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [143].
143. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 126–27.
144. Buried at the end of the guide to enactment is a statement that Article
X should not be implemented with the remainder of the new model law. Id.
pt. 2, ¶ 127.
145. ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 2; ML-IRJ, supra note 9, art. 2.
146. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 2 (d)(ii).
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is a “consequence of” or “materially associated” to an insolvency
proceeding.147 This is vague language. The guide to enactment
does help somewhat by listing non-exhaustive examples “the
types of judgment that might be considered insolvency-related
judgments.”148 Professor Pottow analyzed the creation of the
new model law by UNCITRAL and noted three articles that
garnered the most interesting discourse.149 In particular, WG V
struggled with the definition of “insolvency-related judgment.”150 Ultimately a broad set of neutral words were agreed
upon for this definition.151 Unfortunately, this vague language
has the potential to be quite problematic.
One important thing to note is that the new model law creates the definition for an “Insolvency Representative,”152 but
does not cross-reference this definition with the definition in
the original model law of “Foreign Representative.”153 While
the definitions of the two representatives are very similar, confusion is created by not addressing how the statutory language
should be merged. There are several potential drafting solutions to this issue. 154 For purposes of this Note, it be will as147. Id. pt. 1, art. 2 (d)(i).
148. Id. pt. 2, ¶ 60.
149. Pottow, supra note 7, at 488.
150. Id. at 489. (“[W]hen it came time to start filling in the details, dissension arose over the initial definitional question of just what is an insolvencyrelated judgment. Specifically, discord developed over what actions could and
could not be properly deemed insolvency-related.”) (Internal quotations omitted).
151. Id. at 493.
152. Insolvency Representative “means a person or body, including one appointed on an interim basis, authorized in an insolvency proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or
to act as a representative of the insolvency proceeding . . . “ ML-IRJ, supra
note 9, pt. 1, art. 2 (b).
153. Compare Insolvency Representative “means a person or body, including one appointed on an interim basis, authorized in an insolvency proceeding to administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets
or affairs or to act as a representative of the insolvency proceeding . . . “ Id.
pt. 1, art. 2 (b)., with Foreign Representative “means a person or body, including one appointed on an interim basis, authorized in a foreign proceeding to
administer the reorganization or the liquidation of the debtor’s assets or affairs or to act as a representative of the foreign proceeding . . . “ ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 2 (d).
154. One example, would be to adjust Article 13 in the new model law to
read: “The person seeking recognition and enforcement of the insolvencyrelated judgment is an insolvency representative within the meaning of arti-
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sumed that there is a statement of equivalency between the
two terms defined in the implementation.
C. Decision to Recognize and Enforce Judgment
Article 13 gets to the heart of recognition and enforcement.155
This Article lays out a series of checks, starting with verifying
that the judgment is enforceable.156 Next, it must be verified
that the representative and judgment is valid.157 The following
step is to confirm if the judgment was brought to the proper
court in that jurisdiction.158 Finally, it must be confirmed that
the judgment sought to be recognized does not raise either a
public policy exception or any specific exception under article
14.159 In the new model law, Article 13 performs a similar function to Article 17 in the original model law.160 Article 17 is a
series of checks that move a court towards the recognition of a

cle 2, subparagraph (b), a foreign representative within the meaning of [MLCBI] article 2 subparagraph (d), or another person entitled to seek recognition and enforcement of the judgment under article 11, paragraph 1;” MLIRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 13 (addition emphasized).
155. Article 13 of ML-IRJ states:
Decision to recognize and enforce an insolvency-related
judgment: Subject to articles 7 and 14, an insolvency-related
judgment shall be recognized and enforced provided: (a) The
requirements of article 9 with respect to effect and enforceability are met; (b) The person seeking recognition and enforcement of the insolvency-related judgment is an insolvency representative within the meaning of article 2, subparagraph (b), or another person entitled to seek recognition and
enforcement of the judgment under article 11, paragraph 1;
(c) The application meets the requirements of article 11,
paragraph 2; and (d) Recognition and enforcement is sought
from a court referred to in article 4, or the question of
recognition arises by way of defense or as an incidental
question before such a court.
ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 13; ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 9.
156. Id. pt. 1, art. 13 (a) (referencing that Article 9 must be met).
157. Id. pt. 1, art. 13 (b)–(c) (referencing that Article 11 must be met).
158. Id. pt. 1, art. 13 (d) (referencing that Article 4 must be met).
159. Id. pt. 1, art. 13 (referencing Article 7 and Article 14 must be met).
160. Compare ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 13, with ML-CBI, supra note
6, pt. 1, art. 17.
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foreign proceeding, where Article 13 does the same for an insolvency-related judgment.161
Article 14 provides the list of reasons that a court can refuse
to enforce an insolvency judgment, and while this list is exhaustive, it is also discretionary.162 First, as defined in subpar161. The Articles related to recognition in the original model law, art. 15–
17, were specifically noted in the original model law’s guide to enactment as
designed to make “expedited action possible.” ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 2, ¶
127. Given the similarities between the key recognition provision in the new
model law it is logical to assume the new model law was also designed for
expediency.
162. Article 14 of ML-IRJ states:
Grounds to refuse recognition and enforcement of an insolvency-related judgment: In addition to the ground set forth
in article 7, recognition and enforcement of an insolvencyrelated judgment may be refused if: (a) The party against
whom the proceeding giving rise to the judgment was instituted: (i) Was not notified of the institution of that proceeding in sufficient time and in such a manner as to enable a
defense to be arranged, unless the party entered an appearance and presented their case without contesting notification in the originating court, provided that the law of the
originating State permitted notification to be contested; or
(ii) Was notified in this State of the institution of that proceeding in a manner that is incompatible with the rules of
this State concerning service of documents; . . . (f) The
judgment: (i) Materially affects the rights of creditors generally, such as determining whether a plan of reorganization or liquidation should be confirmed, a discharge of the
debtor or of debts should be granted or a voluntary or out-ofcourt restructuring agreement should be approved; and (ii)
The interests of creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor, were not adequately protected in the
proceeding in which the judgment was issued; (g) The originating court did not satisfy one of the following conditions:
(i) The court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of the explicit consent of the party against whom the judgment was issued; (ii) The court exercised jurisdiction on the basis of the
submission of the party against whom the judgment was issued, namely that that party argued on the merits before
the court without objecting to jurisdiction or to the exercise
of jurisdiction within the time frame provided in the law of
the originating State, unless it was evident that such an objection to jurisdiction would not have succeeded under that
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agraph (a), a court can refuse enforcement due to lack of proper
notification.163 Subparagraph (f) details the rights of creditors,
debtors, and other interest parties, and that a judgment may
be refused if these rights were not adequately protected in the
proceeding that led to the judgment.164
Subparagraph (g) provides the list of reasons to refuse a
judgment based on personal jurisdiction.165 This subparagraph
works counter to the methods of the prior subsections.166 In this
subparagraph, the judgment should not be refused if one of
four jurisdictional tests are met, but again, the entirety of Article 14 is discretionary.167 Per subparagraph (g)(i), the originating court can exercise jurisdiction based on explicit consent,
and per subparagraph (g)(ii), after hearing an objection to personal jurisdiction.168 Article 14(g)(iii) states “the court exercised
jurisdiction on a basis on which a court in this state could have
exercised jurisdiction.”169 This confounding statement is explained in the guide to enactment as:
Subparagraph (g)(iii) provides that the originating court’s exercise of jurisdiction must be seen as adequate if exercised on
a basis on which the receiving Court could have exercised jurisdiction if an analogous dispute had taken place in the receiving State. If the law of the receiving State would have
permitted a court to exercise jurisdiction in parallel circumstances, the receiving court cannot refuse recognition and enforcement on the basis that the originating court did not
properly exercise jurisdiction.170

law; (iii) The court exercised jurisdiction on a basis on which
a court in this State could have exercised jurisdiction; or
(iv) The court exercised jurisdiction on a basis that was not
incompatible with the law of this State.
Id. pt. 1, art. 14 (omitted subparagraphs (b) through (e) and (h)); ML-IRJ,
supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 98.
163. Id. pt. 1, art. 14 (a)–(b).
164. Id. pt. 1, art. 14 (f).
165. Id. pt. 1, art. 14 (g).
166. Id. pt. 2, ¶ 110.
167. Id.; Pottow, supra note 7, at 499.
168. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 14 (g).
169. Id.
170. Id. pt. 2, ¶ 114.
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Article 14(g)(iv) goes even farther and is meant to be another
nod to comity.171 The message of this provision, paraphrased
from the guide to enactment, is to allow recognition if the originating court was behaving reasonably, providing that the “exercise was not incompatible [sic.] with the central tenants of
procedural fairness.”172 Article 14 is completely new language
specific to insolvency-related judgments, and therefore should
be implemented in its entirety.
IV. Application of the New Model Law
Before relitigating Rubin a few comments on assumptions. 173
Using In Re Vitro as a starting point, this Note suggests the
analysis the court should use, and the representative should
apply for, is to start with the recognition of the foreign proceeding under ML-CBI Article 17. Then the court should determine
if relief can be granted using ML-CBI Article 21 narrowly, MLCBI Article 21 broadly, or ML-CBI Article 7.174 If the answer to
all of these is no—as was the case in Rubin175—take the judgment through ML-IRJ Article 13; i.e., this is a mandatory
recognition if the checks are met, unless there is a specific exclusion listed in Article 14 or there is a public policy basis for
not recognizing the insolvency related judgment.176
A. Relitigating Rubin with a Broad Interpretation of the New
Model Law
In Rubin, a judgment was rendered in the US and brought to
the UK.177 David Rubin and Henry Lan applied for and received approval for recognition of the US proceeding as a foreign main proceeding.178 They were also granted recognition as
foreign representatives.179 Relief was not granted under the

171. Pottow, supra note 7, at 500.
172. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 115.
173. Since there is no implementation of the new model law, there is no
specific case law to guide this analysis.
174. In re Vitro, 701 F.3d., at 1053–57.
175. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46.
176. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 13.
177. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [65].
178. Id. [134].
179. Id. I will also assume this designation is sufficient to name the respondents in Rubin as Insolvency Representatives per ML-IRJ Article 2.
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original model law when Article 21, discretionary relief, was
employed.180
Reviewing the new model law, starting with Article 13,
recognition shall be granted, if the conditions of Article 13 are
met and there are no exceptions arising from Article 14 or Article 7, the public policy exception.181 There is no reason to believe that these Article 13 conditions could not be met by Rubin.182 The next step in the analysis is to see if there are any
exclusions from Article 14 or Article 7. 183 It is prudent to begin
with the more specific list from Article 14.
Rubin’s facts quickly eliminate a few of the rationales not to
enforce the judgment. There is no evidence that the judgment
was obtained by fraud, that the judgment is or would potentially be inconsistent with any other judgments, or that enforcing
the judgment would interfere with insolvency proceedings in
the UK.184 In addition, since the insolvency judgment comes
from the US, the condition checking if the judgment is recognizable under the ML-CBI is met.185 Finally, there is a condition related to the protection of the interests of the debtor,
creditor and third parties.186
One of the key points of the Rubin decision is that Eurofinance SA and Roman did not submit to the jurisdiction of
the SDNY Bankruptcy Court during the avoidance proceeding.
Since these parties did not submit or make an appearance to
that court, and since the avoidance judgment was not controlled by the ML-CBI, the UK Supreme Court turned to the
Dicey Rule and determined that the US Court did not have jurisdiction.187 Article 14(a)(ii) provides the fix for this particular
point in Rubin, by allowing for UK service of process.188 There-

180. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46.
181. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 13.
182. While I cannot say for certain, it is a fair assumption that if the foreign
representatives can meet the requirements of the original model law Article
17, that the same representatives would have the capability of meeting the
similar requirements of the new model law Article 13.
183. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 13.
184. Id. pt. 1, art. 14 (b)–(e).
185. Id. pt. 1, art. 14 (h).
186. Id. pt. 1, art. 14 (f).
187. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [169].
188. Metreveli, supra note 11, at 342–43 (Note, at the time that this source
was created what would become Article 14, was structured as Article 13).
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fore, upon relitigating Rubin, the court should find that Eurofinance SA and Roman were served properly.
Similar to service of process, Article 14 also addresses the issues in Rubin, related to personal jurisdiction, in subparagraph
(g).189 This subparagraph is confusing as it effectively works in
reverse to all the other subparagraphs that list the possible exclusion by listing the jurisdictional reasons that are acceptable
for enforcement of judgment, as opposed to the other conditions
that are reasons not acceptable for enforcement of judgment.190
There is agreement that this part of the new model law is directly related to Rubin, and is meant to overturn that decision.191 There is some disagreement over which part of the conditions for jurisdiction are specifically meant to overturn Rubin.192 This Note therefore takes it that this article is successful.
B. Relitigating Rubin with a Narrow Interpretation of the New
Model Law
While one might like to think the analysis of a reconsidered
Rubin under the new model law will be a simple and easy matter, some would suggest that the UK Courts do not feel compelled to follow the new model laws just because UNCITRAL
designed the model law to overturn Rubin.193 Therefore, this
Note will take a more narrow reading to point out three areas
in which the new model law could fail to bring about the
change that was advertised.194
189. See Pottow, supra note 7, at 499–503.
190. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 110.
191. Metreveli, supra note 11, at 344–45; Pottow, supra note 7, at 499–503
(noting that the language in the guide to enactment related to art. 14 (g) is “a
thinly veiled (if veiled at all) rebuke of Rubin.”).
192. See Markell, supra note 45, at 758 (noting it is clause iii that is key to
Rubin.); but see Pottow, supra note 7, at 500 (highlighting that it was the
fourth clause that fixes Rubin).
193. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, 87 TEMP. L.
REV. 739, 746 (2015) (“In the United Kingdom, alas, we find . . . a judicial
attitude that now hovers between hostility and indifference to the Model Law
and perhaps to internationalism in general.”).
194. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 2; see also Alexrod, supra note 119, at
850 (“the idea of overturning long-established, narrow common law in favor of
a broad, toothless model law passed through Parliament with the vague goal
of international ‘cooperation,’ and which would require judicial subordination
to foreign trial courts, is abhorrent to the Court’s institutional motives.”).
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In Rubin, Lord Collins noted that it was not up to judges to
make a list of what might be considered an insolvency-related
judgment.195 Unfortunately, when defining a specific list of
what is and is not an insolvency-related judgment, WG V punted.196 The best that WG V could agree upon was a list of examples documented in the guide to enactment.197 The question becomes: is that sufficient for a future judge revisiting a case with
similar facts as Rubin? Recalling the position of the UK Supreme Court that judges should not produce a specific list of
insolvency-related judgments, this Note recommends this is
one area to fix by implementing the model law.
The purpose of the new model law, effected by Article 13, is to
push countries to recognize foreign insolvency-related judgments.198 The challenge in Rubin is that the original model law
did not account for insolvency-related judgments and therefore,
the UK Supreme Court had to turn to domestic case law in order to determine whether or not to enforce the US avoidance
judgment.199 That court used the Dicey Rule, which required
jurisdiction based on presence, and found that notice and ties
to the SDNY were not sufficient.200 Now that the new model
law concerns foreign insolvency-related judgments, the result
should be that the Dicey rule would not be utilized.201
The new model law does, however, specifically address two
related jurisdictional issues, the consideration of notice and the
consideration of personal jurisdiction.202 Related to notice, Rubin, should be fixed by the statement in Article 14(a)(ii) that
the party “was notified . . . in a manner that is incompatible
with the rules of this state”.203 According to Professor Pottow,
this subparagraph fixes a part of Rubin;204 however, Lia Me-

195. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [129].
196. Pottow, supra note 7, at 489.
197. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 60.
198. Id. pt. 1, art. 13.
199. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [156].
200. Id. [129].
201. This is under the logical presumption that given the four methods of
enforcement listed in Rubin, if the model law had provided a method to enforce the judgment, then the court would not have undertaken the analysis to
review the common law.
202. ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 14.
203. Id.
204. Pottow, supra note 7, at 500.
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treveli disagrees.205 The key seems to be the notion “incompatible with the rules of this state.” If this phrase encompasses all
possible rules applying to both local and foreign judgments,
then Rubin is fixed; however, if this phrase is interpreted as
only the rules that apply to foreign judgments, then the Dicey
rule may still be in play. The second challenge is that the direct
“rebuke” to Rubin in Article 14(g)(iv) contains the exact same
vague phrase “incompatible with the rules of this state.”206
It is challenging to come up with language upon which all the
parties involved in the process of creating model laws can
agree.207 It is also challenging for judges who must interpret
this vague language to follow the path the creators intended.208
Vagueness creates opportunities for havoc. For example, “the
[Rubin] opinion went to pains to disparage the vague language
of the [ML-CBI] and to note that, rather than provide flexibility
to facilitate progressive development of remedies, its text provided a lack of clarity that should be construed strictly.”209
While the new model likely is very likely to reverse Rubin, as
this section suggests, there could be a few potential holes. The
next section will deal with these areas directly.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
There are two areas in the new model law that would benefit
from reconsideration. One area, if not addressed by the legislature, could result in the Rubin decision being left undisturbed
despite the express intent of the model law to overturn that decision. The other area, if addressed by UNCITRAL WG V would
simplify the effort of the UK in implementing the ML-IRJ and
reduce the risk of misinterpretation.210 This section will begin
with the work for UNCITRAL.

205. Metreveli, supra note 11, at 342 (“On its face, the text seems to suggest
that rather than deter inconsistent enforcement, [14](a)(ii) codifies the holding in Rubin, where American service of process on the British defendant
violated both British common law and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act of 1933.”).
206. Pottow, supra note 7, at 500.
207. Id., at 489.
208. See Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46.
209. Pottow, supra note 7, at 485.
210. It would also assist all the countries that have already implemented
the original model law, or any country contemplating implementing both the
ML-CBI and ML-IRJ in the future.
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A. Recommendation 1 — New Guide to Enactment
UNCITRAL WG V did countries that implemented the MLCBI a disservice by ignoring the need for a guide to enactment
in the model law that specifically addresses how to merge the
two model laws together.211 There are only a few places in the
new model law that serve as pointers to the original model
law,212 yet there is significant overlap between the two model
laws that are not addressed.213 For example, here are two places of overlap that should have been addressed in the guide to
enactment: First, the public policy articles are different, and
the difference is only mentioned, but no guidance is given on
reconciling the two.214 Second, the original model law defines a
foreign representative, and with a very similar definition, the
new model law defines an insolvency representative, yet there
is no reconciliation between these two terms.215
These two points are not exhaustive and simply demonstrate
that there needs to be additional work done on the guide to enactment. This Note recommends that WG V explicitly spell out
the merger of the two model laws in the guide to enactment of
the new model law.
B. Recommendation 2 — Specific Legislative Intent
Lord Collins highlighted in Rubin that it should not be up to
the judiciary to make the law where the legislature can be
more specific.216 Therefore, the second recommendation is to
211. See ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 2.
212. See, e.g. Id. pt. 1, art. 14(h); Id. pt. 1, art. X.
213. Compare ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 3–8, with ML-IRJ, supra
note 9, pt. 1, art. 3–8 (each of these articles has substantively identical titles,
yet the guide to enactment is silent to the question – are both needed?)
214. Compare ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 6 (“Nothing in this Law prevents the court from refusing to take an action governed by this Law if the
action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of this State”), with
ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 7 (“Nothing in this Law prevents the court
from refusing to take an action governed by this Law if the action would be
manifestly contrary to the public policy, including the fundamental principles
of procedural fairness, of this State.”) (difference emphasized); ML-IRJ, supra
note 9, pt. 2, ¶ 74.
215. Compare ML-CBI, supra note 6, pt. 1, art. 2 (defining foreign representative), with ML-IRJ, supra note 9, pt. 1, art. 2 (defining insolvency representative).
216. Rubin, [2012] UKSC 46, [129] (“The law relating to the enforcement of
foreign judgments and the law relating to international insolvency are not
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make the intent to overturn Rubin more explicit. There are a
few ways within the enactment of this model law that intent
can be accomplished. In general, a nod to positive aspects of
Cambridge Gas or negative aspects of Rubin, would convey a
message to future cases. Parliament could even go further and
take language directly from Cambridge Gas, perhaps about insolvency judgements being neither in personam or in rem.217
There are signals that can be made at the country level that
perhaps are not available in the overall construction of the
model law.218
There are areas that should be addressed with more direct
phrasing than provided by the model law. For example, when
enacting the model law, Parliament should put together a definitive list of insolvency related judgments directly into the
law. Also, the wording of the model law in Article 14 (a) and 14
(g), is vague. The language needs to be more clearly defined as
accepting the jurisdictional determination of the US Court in
Rubin.
In summary, there is a lot for the UK and other countries to
like about the model law; however, in order to be certain that
the intent of the model law, to fix Rubin, is ensured, during enactment there needs to be some careful consideration in the
language used. In addition, WG V should get to work on improving the enactment guide to better held countries that have
already implemented the original model law to add the tools of
the new model law to their code.
John A. Churchill Jr. *
areas of the law which have in recent times been left to be developed by
judge-made law.”).
217. Cambridge Gas, [2006] UKPC 26, [14].
218. See Pottow, supra note 7.
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